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Economic Analysis and 
Organised   el igion 
EKKEHART SCHLICHT 
In this chapter, Ekkehart Schlicht works outwards from a psycho- 
logical process towards an economic analysis of religion. Humans 
have a desire to understand themselves, the world around them, 
and to evaluate and justiq their actions. This 'quest for sense' 
leads to specialisation in religious activity and to the formation of 
religious organisations. Schlicht explains in which sense it is 
appropriate to apply economic principles of analysis to the under- 
standing of organised religion. 
From this perspective, various aspects of religious organisation 
can be analysed, such as ownership structure, the product mix 
offered by the churches, the pricing of religious services, the 
market structure, and quality competition. 
Some phenomena, such as the prohibition of the selling of indul- 
gences, holy cows, or male and female circumcision, pose obsta- 
cles to economic reasoning and suggest that religious 
interpretation or, more generally, the 'quest for sense', should be 
seen as an independent driving force that works in conjunction 
with other forces to shape societal phenomena. 
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Economics tends to view institutions as optimal responses to 
scarcities, environmental conditions, incentive problems, and 
so forth. Many religious institutions appear, however, bizarre 
and wildly inefficient. Yet these institutions seem important, 
influence human behaviour, and are remarkably stable. This 
poses a problem for economic analysis and highlights its 
general quandary over integrating cultural factors in a non- 
trivial way. We may hope to enhance our understanding of 
the culture-economics interface by studying the particularly 
salient cultural phenomenon of religious organisation. This 
provides the motivation for this essay.' 
The recent literature on the economics of religion provides an 
excellent starting point, but it systematically sidesteps questions 
about the nature of religious activity.2 It takes the specifics of 
demand and supply for religion simply as given. In this, it must 
remain ad hoc, and obliged to remain silent about the culture- 
economics issue. By treating the market for religion just like the 
market for apples, we will certainly find many features that 
these markets have in common, but since we exclude cultural 
considerations, we will be incapable of dealing with them; they 
will escape our analysis just like a stealth bomber escapes the 
enemy's radar. In order to spot something, we must employ 
other instruments. I shall thus draw on arguments from social 
psychology, in addition to using economic tools, in order to 
address the problems of economic-cultural interaction. By 
doing so, we may also find some footing for our assumptions 
about demand and supply, from which the features of religious 
organisation emanate; these will appear less ad hoc. 
Religion is certainly an extremely interesting topic in its own 
right, and this justifies its analysis. I think, however, that an 
analysis of religion from the point of view of economics is of 
much broader significance for economics and social theory in 
general. Let me just stress two aspects. 
Religion as a Freewheeling Superstructure 
The interface between culture and economics or law and 
economics is of particular importance with regard to our 
understanding of the formation of economic institutions. -
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Although it seems that the effectiveness of economic organisa- 
tion depends crucially on institutional features, economics is 
silent about all that. Applying standard economic analysis, it 
could be easily argued that making civic rights saleable will 
increase economic welfare for everybody; or that socialism is as 
efficient as capitalism if only the competences and responsi- 
bili'ries of the functionaries are sharply defined; or that institu- 
tions really do not exist but are only 'legal fictions'. All this 
points to a fundamental weakness of economics with regard to 
cultural phenomena, where it is absolutely imperative to 
improve our understanding in order to come to grips with 
quite obvious efficiency aspects of economic organisation on a 
theoretical level. To understand, however, how the super- 
structure affects economic performance, we need to know how 
the superstructure itself works. The easiest case is the case of 
freewheeling superstructures, or superstructures that are not 
too closely tied to economic exigencies. Several topics come to 
mind here. For just that reason Gvi-Straws (1964-71, 1967) has 
taken mythology as his object of study. More closely related to 
organisational questions are, however, phenomena of organised 
religion and organised sports activities, and the systems of rules 
evolving there. One reason for being concerned with religion is, 
therefore, that I take it as an instance of a partially autonomous 
superstructure that I would like to understand in order to draw 
lessons with regard to economic organisation. 
Religion as a Testing Ground for Models of Man 
The application of economic analysis to religious phenomena 
may reveal the limits of economic analysis and may, at the 
same time, highlight aspects of human nature that economists 
neglect. Since religious activity is so important in almost all 
cultures, it is a feature any theory of man must account for, 
and I find it most unsatisfactory to assume that most of the 
people are most of the time ridiculously foolish and super- 
stitious. Although I do not subscribe to the economists' 
assumption that human beings are always rational and 
selfish, I do not think either that they are never selfish and 
cunning, nor do I think that human beings are systematically 
schizophrenic in being always virtuous in some activities and -
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self-seeking in others. I would like to start from a model of 
man that encompasses all these features in a coherent way- 
or else I would know in fact that my theories rest on wrong 
assumptions to begin with. It seems to me, thus, that the 
combination of mundane economics and otherworldly religion 
is a particularly demanding testing ground for any model of 
man. Before developing a theory, as before developing an 
automobile, it may be advisable to invest in a suitable testing 
ground in order to be able later on to do some testing. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the first part I review 
briefly why and in what sense economic arguments are 
applicable to the analysis of organised religion. Parallels 
between the formation of firms and churches are stressed. 
Both are rooted in specialisation and the division of labour. 
They rely on routines that have proved successful (in some 
evolutionary sense), and so forth. 
In the second part I turn to some characteristics of religious 
activity that may help us to understand various specific 
features in the supply of and demand for religion. The 
central idea here is that religious activity is rooted in the 
desire of men to understand the world and their own place 
therein, and to justify their actions and make moral judge- 
ments. This 'quest for sense' is, however, not confined to reli- 
gious activity but permeates many aspects of culture. As the 
second part is written under the presumption that it presents 
fairly new material to the reader, I found it necessary to ela- 
borate and illustrate the argument quite extensively. 
In the third part, I turn to very specific questions: Why do we 
find specialisation in religious activity? What determines the 
product mix offered by the churches? Why do we find mono- 
polistic market structures, with a few big churches dominating 
the market and sects as small specialised suppliers? What 
explains why the churches do not charge for their services 
individually but rather finance themselves through tax-like 
contributions, and how does all this relate to the 'quest for 
sense' or to other motives and functions of religious activity? 
The last part of the paper deals with a problem of notorious 
difficulty in institutional analysis: the problem of inefficient but 
- 
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persistent institutional arrangements. This pertains to the 
general question of whether religion matters in the sense that it 
really influences human behaviour in a sighcant way. In 
many ways this seems not to be the case. Religions are 
adaptive and malleable in many ways. It is hard to detect 
instances where religion drives behaviour directly, and not 
merely as an intervening variable. We find, however, ineffi- 
cient, and even harmful, religious practices, like male and 
female circumcision, that can hardly be interpreted as optimal 
institutional solutions as brought about by evolution unless the 
specific nature of religious activity is taken into account. 
In conclusion it is argued that those features of religious 
organisation that pose problems for economic analysis suggest 
at the same time that the 'quest for sense', as crystallised in 
interpretations, religions and other cultural phenomena, 
should be seen as an independent driving force of societal 
processes. It may be very weak as compared to other forces, 
but it may work cumulatively over the long term. 
ECONOMICS AND RELIGION 
Selfishness as an 'As  I f  Construct 
Biology does not maintain that genes are selfish, it maintains 
simply that only those genes that behave as if they were selfish 
have survived in evolutionary competition and have spread in 
the relevant population. The assumption of selfishness is thus 
not an assumption about the mentality of genes; it is an 'as if' 
construct that can be defended as a proper description of the 
behaviour of genes by referring to the mechanism of evolu- 
tionary selection. 
Economics certainly employs the selfishness assumption exten- 
sively when analysing individual actions in terms of a uni- 
versal striving for pleasure and profit. In the context of 
institutional analysis, these stipulated motivations are, 
however, theoretical devices just like the assumption that genes 
are selfish. Such an approach can be defended by pointing out 
that there is continuous experimentation in the social and 
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economic sphere, and competition enforces successful beha- 
viour on all market participants, which comes down to the 
assumption that all existing institutions maxirnise their compe- 
titive success, but tells us nothing (or very little) about the 
'true1 motives guiding economic beha~iour.~ 
Thus institutions such as firms or marriages are viewed as 
brought into existence by the routinisation of competitively suc- 
cessful behaviour. The routines may thus be seen as a form of 
storage of the individual's tacit knowledge or the organisation's 
specific operational knowledge (Polanyi, 1962; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982, chaptersA and 5). It seems, however, inappropri- 
ate to consider these routines as brought about by some kind of 
deliberate attempt to maxirnise economic gain: Routines are just 
there. It is essential that they are partially automatic, like skills 
on the individual level, and that they are typically stabilised by 
norms and sanctions rather than by any appeal to their useful- 
ness. It is true that the striving for economic gain may motivate 
organisational experimentation within firms and markets, but 
this is not essential to the argument. Variation of any kind, and 
irrespective of the underlying motivation, will unleash competi- 
tive forces. The motives that cause modifications in marriage 
arrangements may, for instance, be rather remote from 
economic considerations in any narrow sense. 
A study of British manufacturing firms illustrates this point 
with regard to firm organisation. The investigation was con- 
cerned with the interrelationship between organisational struc- 
ture and economic success. One set of findings was summarised 
as follows: 'Again no relationship between the "rules" of man- 
agement and business success appeared in the preliminary 
analysis of the research data. The 20 firms graded as out- 
standingly successful seemed to have little in common. When, 
however, firms were grouped on a basis of their production 
systems, the outstandingly successful ones had at least one 
feature in common. Many of their organisational characteristics 
approximated to the median of their production group. For 
example, in successful unit-production firms the span of control 
of the first line supervisor ranged from 22 to 28, the median for 
the group was 23; in successful mass-production firms it ranged 
from 45 to 50, the median of the group being 49; and in suc- 
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cessful process-production firms it ranged from 11 to 15, the 
median for the group being 13. Conversely the firms graded 
below average in most cases diverged widely from the 
median'.5 In other words, firms clustered around optimal orga- 
nisational patterns, but this was certainly not the result of delib- 
erate optirnisation. Rather, it was the outcome of a trial and 
error process working in a competitive environment. Thus there 
is a tendency towards adopting those organisational structures 
that maximise competitive success, and we may look for similar 
tendencies working in the realm of religious organisation. 
Organised religion can be analysed in a similar way with refer- 
ence to competition in the 'market for religion': we may view 
organised religions, or traditions within a religion, as con- 
stituted by a set of routines, and may ask why certain routines 
spread and others disappear, and this may explain important 
features of organised religion. All this does not presuppose 
however, that the practitioners of religion, or the organisers of 
religious practices, act for mundane motives. On the contrary, 
we may even be in a position to argue that the dominance of 
certain purely religious motives in the absence of mundane 
concerns is competitively successful in a certain environment 
and thus prevails in so far as it brings about behaviour that 
succeeds in the market. The Quaker case illustrates that. 
To apply competitive analysis in this 'as if' sense to organised 
religion does not mean, therefore, that one is bound to be 
cynical about the motives of the believers. 
Demand and Supply 
We cannot draw conclusions without presuppositions. Ulti- 
mately, our theories must rest on a reasoned conception of 
human nature. This need not be a complete model of man. For 
many questions it suffices to start with a schematic picture, 
with many traits left blank. In economics we assume, for 
instance, that there is a desire for commodities, but the nature 
of the desire is not spelled out and it is left open what the 
details of the commodities are that render them desirable. 
Economic analysis can, in many cases, work without going into 
these details. - 
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In this vein we could start with the assumption that human 
beings have a desire for reli ion, and we may take this 
'demand for religion' as given! There would be no need to 
judge whether this demand is sensible or not, or justifiable or 
not, or corresponds to ultimate truth, just as there is no need to 
evaluate whether a taste for chocolate or pop music is good or 
bad. De gustibus non est disputandum. The demand for religion 
would be just a matter of taste like any other kind of demand. 
Such a view would imply that there is no analytical difference 
whatsoever distinguishing the demand for religion from other 
demands. The demand for religious services would be assirni- 
lated to demands for other services of a ceremonial or con- 
sultative nature. (The fact that the teachings of the church may 
affect the demand for religion is not specific at all to religion; 
advertising achieves the same in the mundane sphere.) If we 
start with a demand for religion as a given, we must do the 
same with regard to all the particularities of the demand for 
religion that may contribute to the specifics of religious phe- 
nomena. 
Similarly, the supply of religion may be analysed while dis- 
regarding the specific nature of religion. One would proceed 
by assuming that productivity gains could be obtained by 
specialising in the supply of religious services, and that institu- 
tions will form to provide them. 
In this way, the demand for and the supply of religion may be 
discussed on an equal footing with other demands and 
supplies. This has the great advantage of creating a frame of 
reference where particularities in institutionalisation can be tied 
to particularities of the commodity in question. In principle, it 
should be possible to tie all specifics of organised religion to 
the specific features of the product. The argument can then be 
checked by looking at other markets where similar problems 
arise and the same arguments must apply. 
By simply sidestepping the question of what religion is all 
about, economic analyses can actually shed light on many 
features of religious organisation. Such an approach-the usual 
approach-must, however, necessarily take as given all the 
particularities of demand and supply on which the analysis 
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builds. In this sense, it must remain ad h ~ c . ~  By looking more 
closely into the nature of religion, we may be able to reduce 
this arbitrariness. At the same time, we may gain a better 
understanding of the interaction between economic and 
cultural influences. It is with this perspective that I turn now to 
some specifics of religious activity. 
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION 
The Quest for Sense 
The nature of the demand for religion, and the supply condi- 
tions of religion, emerge from the specific nature of religious 
activity. Their fundamental unity and their importance for 
human beings distinguishes them from other human activities. 
All this may be obscured if we start from surface attributes of 
religious activity without linking them to the underlying 
driving forces. 
It is in some ways even misleading to consider the demand for 
religion as being of the same nature as any other demand. In 
this I leave the view traditionally entertained in economics, 
which insists that no useful distinction can be drawn between a 
taste for chocolate, a taste for racial discrimination, or a taste 
for religion.' So let me briefly characterise what I feel is central 
for any understanding of religious activity. This may clanfy the 
point that a 'taste' for religion, like a 'taste' for truth, is more 
objectively obliging than other tastes, however widely shared. 
This has consequences with regard to understanding religion in 
so far as it explains particularities of demand and supply that 
would have to be presupposed otherwise. In this, it supple- 
ments the economic argument, but at the same time permits us 
to understand features of religious organisation that can hardly 
be understood from a narrow economic point of view. 
My point of departure is that man has a desire to understand 
his surroundings, to understand his own place in the universe 
and to form theories about all that. This desire is the basis for 
all our thinking and our forming theories about the world, or, 
in my case, thinking about the formation of religion. "It is the 
- 
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quest for understanding or, in its corrupted form, for rationali- 
sation. The strength of this motive is evident. IRvi-Strauss has 
presented detailed analyses of cosmologies, myths, and kinship 
systems in various cultures that establish its importance and, 
indeed, its invariance, across cultures; and modern social psy- 
chology has demonstrated experimentally the importance of 
the drive towards cognitive consistency and aversion to cogni- 
tive dissonance as a determinant of motivation and action in 
many  field^.^ 
There is, however, another element of universal importance 
that is all too often neglected if a rationalistic distinction is 
drawn between value judgements and factual judgements. 
Cognitions and ethical valuations go together in a systematic 
way. Valuations are tied to the perceived meaning of things or 
situations, and what the circumstances demand, and a reli- 
gious understanding of the world implies an understandin 
what ought to be done to live up to the meaning of things. k 
This fact-that valuations require reasons and that cognitions 
induce valuations-permeates everyday life. The everyday 
propensity for self-deception, the desire to rationalise various 
silly actions in terms of even sillier constructions, witnesses 
that there is a desire to supply reasons of interpersonal 
validity. Racism is defended with reference to studies about 
physical, intellectual or emotional differences among races; the 
role differentiation between men and women is linked to 
physical characteristics that predispose women to be the care- 
takers of the children. Consider further what is involved if 
biologists put humans and apes into the same category by 
pointing out their evolutionary kinship. This may be seen as a 
degradation of humans, it may also be seen as a revalorisa- 
tion of apes, but it is not ethically neutral although such a 
discovery does not change the current nature of humans or 
apes in the least. Also, Galileo might have had a more 
pleasant career if his discovery had not been perceived at the 
time as undermining the authority of the church in questions 
quite unrelated to cosmology. Quite generally, people link 
their valuations and actions to their cognitions. This actually 
distinguishes a simple taste from a valuation. If I maintain 
that people should not be discriminated against according to -
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race, I will point out that I cannot find any ethi~ally~relevant 
difference between people of two difference races. This refers 
to an objective feature of reality rather than to my taste. The 
selection of what I consider 'ethically relevant' may appear 
arbitrary, but again I will not consider this as a mere matter 
of taste; it is, and should be, arguable and valid quite inde- 
pendently of my idiosyncrasy; it should tie back to my under- 
standing of the nature of things and beings. This is precisely 
what differentiates it from a taste for chocolate, about which I 
cannot argue any further. 
I take, thus, as a second driving force behind the demand for 
religion, the quest for righteousness, that is interlinked with 
the quest for understanding in the way which I have indicated. 
People try to find guidance for their own behaviour or try to 
justdy it in terms of statements about the nature of things, and 
they try to find out how they ought to behave by using argu- 
ments referring to facts and interpretations of these facts. 
The quest for understanding and the quest for righteousness 
are thus joined to what may be termed a 'quest for sense'. I see 
this quest for sense as an irreducible factor of religious 
demand." This does not exclude, however, the possibility that 
other more mundane motives, such as social, political and 
economic concerns, may play a role in determining religious 
demand. These factors may indeed be very important, but we 
should not neglect the quest for sense as an underlying motive. 
An aside may be in place here. I neither wish to glorify human 
nature nor to depict it as contemptible, I would like to take 
human nature as it is. It should be stressed, therefore, that 
what I have said about the quest for sense may be interpreted 
in two opposite ways: The first interpretation would be that 
human nature is basically noble, and that, perhaps, human 
beings do not entirely belong to this world. The second 
interpretation is that all the apparent grandeur of the quest for 
sense is the result of a selfish desire for self-glorification: people 
may take pride in thinking of their own character as particu- 
larly noble and elevated and vastly superior to the mean nature 
of other human beings and, in order to prove that to them- 
selves, they look for elevated motives that can be seen as 
- 
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ranging above simple tastes, but they do this for purely selfish 
reasons.12 We need not, however, embark on one or the other 
interpretation. Let us just take the quest for sense as given. 
It could be argued here that the quest for sense must be the 
outcome of biological evolution: those genes that exhibited this 
feature have spread. This is certainly the case: everything that 
we find today has a history, and we may find that the quest 
for sense is rooted in socio-economic and genetic coevolution 
(Crook, this volume, and Odling-Smee, this volume). It seems, 
however, that the cognitive and emotional dispositions giving 
rise to this tendency in humans are fairly invariant in historical 
time and across cultures. We may safely take them as given in 
the present context. 
The Transcendental as Good Continuity 
Religions often deal with gods and other 'supernatural' forces. 
Although these beliefs may appear strange and even foolish to 
the non-believer, they are held by reasonable people who act 
quite sensibly in other contexts. This may imply that people 
have a split personality, acting sensibly in the economic realm 
and hopelessly irrationally in the religious context. There is, 
however, also the possibility that there is no gap between 
mundane and spiritual matters, and religious belief and reli- 
gious activity form an integral part of all kinds of behaviour 
and cognitive and emotional endeavour. In the following I am 
going to argue that this is indeed the case. We find the same 
impulses to act, think and feel, working in all spheres of life, in 
religion along with economics, and including the present 
writer's attempt to understand religion, and the reader's 
attempt to understand this in turn.13 
Consider the following sequence of numbers: 
If we want to memorise it, we may consider it as an arithmetic 
sequence with the '8' missing. The sequence makes more sense 
if we complete it with the number 8. It can be memorised and 
recalled more easily. The element 8 is what the gestalt psychol- -
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ogists termed 'good continuity'. We may even say that the 
element 'is objectively present' in the sequence, although it is 
not physically there. It does not depend on our wish or caprice 
what good continuity entails; it is objectively given and 
implied by the meaning of the series. Everybody who under- 
stands the series will come up with the 8 as the missing 
element, and the series makes more sense if this element is 
added.14 
In science we augment reality in a similar way in order that it 
make sense to us. We calculate with imaginary numbers, add 
another dimension to our three-dimensional world or talk 
about 'mass' and 'gravity', although nobody has observed 
these abstract things. We should not say that these things are 
merely imagined and not real because we cannot touch them. 
We cannot touch numbers, after all. Although we feel that 
imaginary numbers are 'less real' than real numbers, all these 
concepts are neither subjective imaginations nor crude empiri- 
cal facts. If we add these concepts to reality, reality makes 
more sense. 
In this way we may understand that the quest for sense ma 
render it, in a way, rational to introduce the transcendental. X 
The transcendental should not be confined, however, to cogni- 
tive aspects alone. As argued above, the quest for sense refers 
also to moral justifications and their interconnections with 
positive knowledge. The series (1) requires the missing element 
for instance, and it would therefore be morally justified to 
supply it. We should consider moral justifications in the same 
vein and should conceive things in this broader setting.16 
The view of the transcendental as good continuity has some 
advantages. It explains the objective character attributed to 
religious phenomena; it suggests an explanation for what seem 
to be systematic interconnections between the character of 
society and the religions emerging in such a society; we need 
not postulate a special 'taste for rites' to explain the demand 
for religion in its specific forms; and we even may understand 
why the old writers, such as Smith (1976, p. 312), drew a sharp 
distinction between superstition and true religion, which they 
lumped together with philosophy and science. 
- 
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Apparitions 
The tendency to make sense out of what we observe-the 
quest for understanding-manifests itself nicely in apparitions, 
and the following discussion is intended as an illustration. 
An apparition appeared quite recently in Kenosha, Wisconsin, 
USA. The Minneapolis Star Tribune of 5 May 1991 reported: 
You do not need to be a believer to see the image of Jesus on the 
Church wallpaper, but it helps . . . Worshippers have been seeing a 
figure of Jesus there since April 7. But they're also seeing many other 
things. Some see a large face just over the St Francis statue; others see 
the entire last supper, Jesus in the Garden, the Blessed Mother, angels 
. . . 'I think it's soot on the wallpaper, but I also think it wouldn't have 
formed this way unless it was formed by the hand of God', said Julie 
Jaeger of Kanosha who brought her husband and children . . . 
Dolores Marinelli's eyes sparkle as she tells of first seeing the image 
. . . 'I looked up and knew right away it was Jesus. I looked away and 
then looked back and it was still there' . . . She has been questioned by 
a world full of skeptics. Many people ask how she knows it's Jesus. No 
one knows exactly what Jesus looked like. Many ask how she knows 
the figure is a man. Maybe it's one of the other apostles. Maybe it's 
just soot. 
She just smiles. She knows. 'It just depends on your faith. I just know 
who I saw, and it's ~esus'" 
It seems clear that the pattern on the wallpaper makes sense if 
you have faith, but does not make sense if you are not a 
believer. Holding a faith may be considered rational since it 
explains and gives sense to phenomena that would otherwise 
remain unexplained. At the same time, an apparition will 
strengthen the faith of the faithful, and it will strengthen the 
ethical positions associated with the belief.'' On the other 
hand, the nonbeliever will feel inclined to give mundane 
reasons that explain the apparition. This exemplifies the same 
quest for understanding that drives the believer. 
Scientists actually work in very much the same way as the 
faithful do when faced with a new observation. Statisticians try 
to detect patterns in data, and other scientists try to fit 
whatever they observe into their world-view, as embodied in 
their theories. In earlier times, many astronomers were also 
astrologers. Or look at economics. Economists tend to perceive 
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all actions as the result of a striving for profit and gain. 
Whatever appears is seen, so to speak, as an apparition of 
utility maximisation. Consider some examples.'9 
Becker and Murphy (1988, p. 675) propose 'A Theory of 
Rational Addiction'. They write: 
Rational consumers maxirnise utility from stable preferences as they try 
to anticipate the future consequences of their choices. Addiction would 
seem to be the antithesis of rational behaviour. Does an alcoholic or a 
heroin user maxirnise or weigh the future? Surely his preferences shift 
rapidly and his mood changes? Yet, as the title of our paper indicates, 
we claim that addictions, even strong ones, are usually rational in the 
sense of involving forward-looking maximisation with stable pre- 
ferences. Our claim is even stronger: a rational framework permits new 
insights into addictive behaviour. 
The book by McKenzie and Tdock (1975) on 'The New World 
of Economics' deals with many topics outside the traditional 
economic sphere from an economic point of view, and illus- 
trates nicely how economists integrate various phenomena into 
their frame of referen~e.~' With regard to sexual behaviour 
they write, for example: 
The amount of sex that is produced and consumed is not in our view 
determined by the gods. Granted, men and women have biological 
drives and they are not constrained on sexual behaviour. Men and 
women, however, have some control over these drives. (as a general 
rule) and do not engage in sex to the extent of their biological cap- 
abilities. The amount of sex produced and consumed is the result of 
the interaction of individuals within what we might call social space 
(or the market). For an explanation of how the amount of sex actually 
consumed and produced is determined, we must look to the forces 
which these individuals bring to bear on this interaction process. 
A restatement of principles that have been intrinsic in much of the 
discussion that has gone before would be helpful. These principles are 
the laws of demand and supply. We assume that the demand curve 
for sex by either males or females is downward sloping and that, as a 
reasonable generality, the market supply curve of sex is upward 
sloping. Therefore, the quantity of sex supplied will increase with the 
price paid for it . . . 
If the supply and demand for sex were determined solely by biological 
drives, and if these drives were equal for men and women (which may 
not be the case) . . . the price, or non-money payment, paid for the sex 
would be zero . . . Such circumstance does not, however, realistically 
reflect the general state of the world. Women are restricted from fully 
revealing their biological drives. They bear a substantial portion of the 
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risk costs associated with pregnancy . . . At a zero price, there will 
then exist a shortage of sex to men . . . We might anticipate, therefore, 
that non-money payments in any number of forms (security, dining 
out, etc.) will be offered. (McKeuzie and Tullock, 1975, pp. 57-8) 
Their interpretation of Maslow's theory of motivation reads as 
follows: 
Maslow apparently has observed that people fulfill a higher percentage 
of their psycliological needs than other needs. Our line of argument 
suggests that this may have been the case because the price of psycho- 
logical need fulfillment is lower than the prices of fulfilling other 
needs. (It may also be that the demand for psychological satisfaction is 
more elastic than other demands . . ). (McKeuzie and Tullock, 1975, pp. 
42-43) 
It should be clear from these examples how the quest for 
understanding leads economists to view the world in a very 
particular way. A Freudian interpretation may look quite dif- 
ferent. 
Any interpretation of this sort, religious, economic, or other, 
carries normative implications. Our quest for righteousness will 
lead us to ask what would be suggested to put things in order 
again, and we will do so on the basis of the interpretation 
chosen. Consider just the example of addiction. If addiction is 
seen as a deliberate and free choice, this suggests quite other 
policies than if it were held that addicted persons are not their 
own masters anymore. Further, if the rational addiction model 
is successful in explaining many observed features of addiction 
(as the authors claim), this will strengthen our belief in the 
economic world-view in general, along with the normative 
implications going with such a view. We want to put things 
into their natural order, and the natural order will be sug- 
gested to us by the economic model in this case. 
Uniqueness 
All religions claim that theirs is the true religion and, by impli- 
cation, that other beliefs are false. Further, it seems that we 
cannot hold two different beliefs at the same time with ease." 
Let us call this the 'uniquenessJ feature. 
This feature is not confined to religion, but is manifest in manj 
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cognitive and emotional activities. Consider Figure 3.1. It is not 
quite clear whether this displays the word 'ZOO' or the 
number '200'. We cannot hold, however, both interpretations 
in our mind at the same time. (The second and third characters 
are actually ambiguous, they can refer to the digit '0' or to the 
letter '0'. Which interpretation is to be chosen depends entirely 
on the context.) 
As a further example, consider the cube in Figure 3.2. This can 
be seen h two different ways, either from abovi. or from 
below, but again we cannot hold the two different interpreta- 
tions in our mind simultaneously. Note also that there is no 
continuum of possible interpretations: there are just two differ- 
ent and discrete interpretations, and nothing in-between. 
In general we cannot think about two different things at the 
same time, and it is also rare that we are happy and sad, or 
angry and at ease simultaneously. 
In a similar manner, there is a tendency to stick to one religion 
at a time. We cannot, however, switch as easily between differ- 
zoo 
Figure 3.7 
Figure 3.2 
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ent interpretations of the world as, say, between different 
interpretations of the cube in Figure 3.2. This induces a natural 
tendency towards exclusiveness and may favour monopoly in 
religious activities, so to speak. This may help us to under- 
stand some organisational features of religion. 
The uniqueness feature indicates a tendency of religious 
activity, but is not an immutable trait, People can obviously 
switch their religious beliefs, just as they can switch their 
lawyer, but switching costs seem to be high, comparable 
perhaps to the costs of emigrating: such a move requires us to 
remould our entire personality. Yet this is not impossible. 
Further, people may very well hold different inconsistent 
beliefs at the same time, like being Roman Catholic and believ- 
ing in superstitions that the church condemns. Still religious 
endeavour is related to truth, and truth is seen as fundamen- 
tally unique. This seems to be responsible for the strong 
tendency towards uniqueness in religious activity, which is, 
however, only a tendency. 
Coherence and Accentuation 
The quest for sense induces us to look for good continuity, and 
to remove ambiguities. 
Ambiguities can be removed by adding features that 
strengthen the one and discount the other interpretation. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are obtained from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 by 
adding something. This renders them less ambiguous. 
These examples illustrate that the framing of an item-how it 
is placed into a context-may change its meaning not only 
marginally, but fundamentally.22 By framing, religions may 
affect the meaning of events in a fundamental way by creating 
a more comprehensive context. This may render the meaning 
of everything more definite. In this way, religion accentuates 
meaning. 
Accentuation also takes place on a more elementary level. We 
perceive, understand, memorise, and recall various items by 
perceiving them as variants of a particularly clear and simple 
prototype specimen, a schema, and we note the difference 
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Figure 3.3 
between the item and the schema that it  invoke^.'^ We may 
thus describe a swan as a bird with a long neck, or Figure 3.5 
as a triangle with a dissected peak. 
Our perception, memory, and recall tend to maximum clarity. 
This means that divergences between the schema and the item 
it refers to tend to be either accentuated or minimised. These 
effects of 'levelling' and 'sharpening' are quite systematic and 
may be seen as an attempt of our minds to achieve maximum 
clarity.24 If Figure 3.5 is reproduced from memory, the size of 
the dissection will usually be exaggerated. Many optical illu- 
sions build on this effect. At the same time, these 'distortions' 
are highly functional in that they permit superb pattern recog- 
nition in diffuse environments. 
In religion, we find all these tendencies reinforcing each other: 
good continuity gives a definite meaning to other-wise am- 
biguous phenomena. It reduces uncertainty and, at the same 
time, accentuates certain aspects while discounting others. All 
this builds on a discontinuum of possible interpretations. 
(There is no continuum between Christianity and Islam.) 
Figure 3.4 
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Figure 3.5 
The many rituals that we find in religion (but not only in 
religion) may be seen as accentuations. They highlight certain 
events and embed them in the religious universe. This 
sharpens the meaning of the events and stresses the coherenke 
of the religion at the same time.25 
Reliability and Coherence 
Many religious teachings make assertions that are nearly 
impossible to assess. This induces a pervasive reliability 
problem. Whatever is asserted about the hereafter or about the 
life of the dead and the intentions of the spirits is hard to test. 
The believer must rely on the trustworthiness of the religious 
teachin s. Religious services are, to a large extent, 'credence 
goods'. g6 
Similar reliability problems arise in other circumstances. 
Whatever is asserted about the conditions on the surface of 
Mars is hard to test by direct experience. Nevertheless we rely 
on the astronomers' theories because they offer good continuity 
of our earthly experience and account for many observable 
astronomical regularities. This renders the astronomers' predic- 
tions credible even if they are not independently verifiable, and 
we confidently build on them when sending a spaceship to 
~ a r s . ~ ~  
The same holds true with regard to religion: unverifiable 
claims become reliable if they are tied together with verifiable 
propositions in a coherent way. The reliability problem renders 
coherence extremely important on a practical level. Coherence 
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is not only required by our quest for sense, but also to 
overcome reliability problems. This may help us to understand 
particular organisational solutions in the realm of religion. 
RELIGION AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
Specialisation in Religious Activity 
Starting with the quest for sense as a universal human char- 
acteristic, we may ask why this may give rise to specialisation 
in religious activity, and ultimately to organised religion. 
The quest for sense will give rise to a demand for interpreta- 
tion and advice. We will improve our understanding of the 
world by exchanging views with others in order to make sure 
that we have not overlooked something important or have 
drawn fallacious conclusions and acted in a wrong way. Those 
people with the most expertise will be able to give the most 
valuable advice, and by helping in this way, their expertise 
will improve further. In addition, ad hoc interpretations made 
to meet immediate demand are prone to induce various con- 
tradictions with other observations and interpretations, 
whereas the advice given by experienced sages tends to be 
more systematic, less contradictory, and more satisfactory. 
We may summarise this by saying that such advice can be 
characterised by large fixed costs and learning-by-doing effects. 
This will lead to specialisation for economic reasons. The best 
religious service can be obtained from those with most experi- 
ence in the field, and their activity will increase their 
competitive edge still further. If somebody has a problem, he 
will consult the specialist. Given the nature of the service, we 
should expect, therefore, that some persons specialise in the 
supply of religion, just like others specialise in other activities: 
the lawyers specialise in legal advice, the physicians specialise 
in health advice, and so forth. 
In the end, a division of labour and specialisation in religious 
service will occur. Religion will not remain confined to simple 
household production. 
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Limits to Specialisation 
This argument does not explain, however, why specialisation 
does not go further. Why are there no religious specialists for 
birth, and others for marriage, and still others specialising in 
the confession of particular sins, just like there are lawyers spe- 
cialising in criminal law and others specialising in divorce? 
Why is specialisation not pushed further?28 
Coherence It may be argued here that the quest for sense 
establishes a demand for coherence across different realms of 
life. Further, coherence will contribute towards mitigating the 
reliability problem. This establishes the desirability of a certain 
minimum of coherence in the teachings. 
This argument does not actually explain why the division of 
labour is not pushed further in the market for religion, since 
similar co-ordination problems occur in other fields. The usual 
market response is still specialisation, but some geople specia- 
lise in co-ordination. This gives rise to the firm. We find for 
that reason that partnerships emerge in law, architecture, con- 
sulting and medicine. Why no partnerships in religion? So the 
coherence argument would not suffice to explain why we 
mainly find general-purpose priests. 
Economies of scope Another line of argument to explain the 
limited specialisation in religious activities would be to look at 
economies of scope. Economies of scope arise in the production 
of two commodities if it is cheaper to produce them jointly 
rather than separately. Similarly, there may be cost advantages 
if a certain bundle of religious services is supplied jointly. 
Possible reasons are listed below. 
1. Informational interlinkages. Economies of scope may occur if 
the various religious services are interlinked in such a way that 
specialisation would require a multiplication of information 
flows. Assume, for example, that each specialised activity 
requires some knowledge about a certain characteristic of the 
customer. In this case, specialisation may be uneconomical 
because this would render it necessary to produce the same in- 
formation several times for each specialist, and it may be argued -
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that priests do not specialise for the same reasons as family 
doctors. This arrangement economises on information flows. 
2. Reputational interlinkages. Economies of scope may also 
occur through reputational effects. Many promises made by a 
priest cannot be checked easily with regard to their validity 
since they often refer to the hereafter. The reliability problem 
can be eased if the priest is also engaged in activities where his 
performance and trustworthiness can be monitored; he may 
earn a reputation for reliability there, and this will render his 
less tangible promises more reliable too. Such an argument 
must assume that the reputation for reliability rests mainly 
with the individual priest and not so much with the institution 
he is associated with. Otherwise an institution may earn a 
good reputation even if it comprises many highly specialised 
employees, and reputational interlinkages would contribute to 
explaining the product range offered by a firm, but not so 
much the lack of specialisation within a church. It will be 
argued below that the emergence of monopolistic churches 
may be seen as a market response to a severe reliability 
problem, and reputation should actually rest with the church. 
Organisation and Ownership 
Many religious services are non-rival: many may attend the 
same mass at the same time. It may even be that the mass 
becomes better the more people participate: religious services 
may be 'crowding goods' (Iannacone, 1992). All this leads, in a 
range, to increasing returns to the size of the congregation, and 
this renders the organisation of religious activities useful. 
Religions are, however, usually not supplied by profit-maximis- 
ing firms. Even if churches run enterprises on a large scale, as 
the Mormons do, they do not distribute the profits openly to 
their members; rather the profits are used to provide additional 
services for the members or further commercial activities. In this, 
churches can be seen as non-profit firms, and the features that 
give rise to non-profits can be found in churches. All these insti- 
tutions provide commodities where there is no rivalry in con- 
sumption and people rely on the quality of the service without 
being able really to control it (Ben-Ner and van Homissen, 1991). 
The reason is that the profit motive would introduce an incen- 
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tive to cheat on hidden quality aspects, and so the reliability 
problem makes the non-profit constraint emerge as a competi- 
tively dominant feature of church organisation. 
For similar reasons, ownership is restricted to the members of 
the church, and non-transferable ownership shares are issued. 
This is interpreted by Ben-Ner and van Homissen (1991) in the 
context of non-profit firms as a means to prevent the con- 
centration of control. This may often work, but it seems to 
have failed in the case of the Catholic church with its fairly 
concentrated power structure. 
The Product Mix 
Churches offer a certain product mix: they supply, apart from 
their services, rituals for birth, marriage and death, they run 
kindergartens, vacation enterprises, nursing homes and hospi- 
tals, but they do not offer, as a rule, birthday parties or 
banking services. The economic arguments relevant here refer 
again to economies of scope. 
If several rituals are offered by the same church, this certainly 
involves economies of scope of some sort. The facilities used 
are the same, and their importance is heightened by inter- 
connections of meaning between them. It seems hard to under- 
stand, however, why there should be economies of scope 
involved in supplying marriage rituals and kindergartens 
jointly and at the same time not supply the flowers and photo- 
graphs, dresses and dinriers that go along with all the rituals, 
not merely with marriage. 
The problem is difficult to tackle because the legal and fiscal 
system often treats religious organisations quite differently 
from ordinary business firms. In Germany, religious groups 
may enjoy significant tax advantages and their employees are 
largely not covered by the general labour law. This leads to 
considerable cost advantages. Still, some comparisons can be 
made. Consider the Bhagwan sect. It runs firms in construc- 
tion, art, sound engineering, jewellery and discos (Der Spiegel, 
1984). This makes economic sense. The members of this sect, 
just like monks and nuns, do not mind working very hard and 
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very long. To them, working is worshipping, and it seems 
reasonable that they take up that kind of work which gives the 
highest return, and they will be in a position to out-compete 
many private suppliers. The same seems to hold true for the 
established churches: They have lower labour costs and lower 
transfers payable to the state authorities, and they do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the labour unions. All this gives them 
a competitive edge. 
As a result of preferential treatment, traditional churches enjoy 
a similar competitive edge in nearly all spheres of economic life, 
but they seem to confine their concerns to some traditional 
activities. This needs to be explained. It seems clear that the 
churches do not run discos, since this would infringe on coher- 
ence: it seems not quite compatible with their teachings and 
would render them less trustworthy. (Their youth clubs in 
church halls may, however, engage in these activities.) In 
contrast, mnnhg discos does not infringe on coherence in the 
Bhagwanis' religion. It seems, however, hard to make a similar 
point with regard to the production of double pane windows, 
where the Bhagwanis were quite successful. Why should this 
infringe on consistency? Ideas come to mind of course. It may 
be that the churches lose consistency if they go too much into 
mundane businesses; all their endeavours should be linked to 
their mission. Otherwise the identity, and therefore the trust- 
worthiness, of the product would suffer. After all, when Volks- 
wagen bought the typewriter firm Triumph-Adler, it continued 
to sell the typewriters and computers under the tainted old 
name and not under the 'good' name Volkswagen, and its Audi 
division is run independently in order to preserve the luxury 
class image of these cars. There is, however, another restriction 
imposed by the consistency requirement: Church businesses 
will be scrutinised much more with regard to their moral stan- 
dards, and this restricts their possibilities and may put them in 
a disadvantaged position, compared to private firms. 
The problem does not seem fully solved, however. It seems to 
me that the coherence line of argument would require that 
churches engage in banking activities where reliability plays 
such a prominent role as well. Church-owned banks would 
have a stronger incentive to avoid fraud than privately owned 
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banks, since fraud would hurt their credibility in their religious 
activities. This seems to be a mechanism for successful 
banking, and for attaining massive economic influence and 
power, and it should be seen together with the fact that the 
Catholic church was actually engaged in borrowing and 
lending activities on a large scale in the Middle Ages and is 
still engaged in banking a~tivities.~' It may, however, be the 
case that the introduction of money, which belongs to the 
mundane sphere, does interfere with the understanding of 
religion, as it has evolved in the Catholic church, and would 
thus infringe on coherence. The coherence requirement may 
pose a 'meaning constraint' on the churches, preventing them 
from going into banking.31 
Consider, however, activities like kindergartens, where the 
churches subsidise rather than earn profits. These enterprises 
can be understood as services to their members and also as 
marketing activities to attract new customers, childhood reli- 
gious instruction being associated with future church atten- 
dance (Iannacone, 1990, p. 309). Note also that the political 
parties finance youth groups for perhaps similar reasons. 
Pricing 
It is a characteristic of churches that they finance themselves 
through contributions. With respect to regular gatherings, this 
is to be expected from economic considerations. If entry fees 
were charged for attending a mass, people would pay a certain 
amount of money. If they were required to pay this amount of 
money as a fixed fee, they would be better off, since they 
would be free to attend additional masses at no cost, and the 
church could even charge a little more. If church attendance is 
a 'crowding good' that becomes the more desirable the more 
people consume it, this argument will even be strengthened 
(Iannacone, 1992). In short, what applies here applies to all 
health clubs, sports clubs and so forth, which usuall charge 
fixed fees rather than price their services individually. 3T 
With regard to individual services like confessions and cere- 
monies, such an argument does not apply, however. Similar 
activities elsewhere, like legal and psychiatric counselling, are 
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charged individually. It could be argued here that a confes- 
sion is actually more to -the church's benefit than to the 
benefit of the individual making it.33 Such an argument is 
further vindicated by the fact that some sects charge heavily 
for various seminars offering salvation, which is clearly a 
matter of self-interest. In contrast, the reason for behaving in 
accordance with the wish of God is, in many religions, not 
tied to a selfish desire for individual well-being or afterlife 
consumption, but rather to self-denial and doing good for its 
own sake or for the love of God. This seems to be a quite dif- 
ferent story, closer to a gift-exchange relationship that would 
be hurt by introducing money, as Titrnuss (1971) has argued. 
We see here again that economic analysis is to be supple- 
mented by a 'meaning constraint' in order to understand 
specific organisational 
A similar 'meaning constraint' must be invoked, it seems to 
me, if we look at the fact that the selling of indulgences has 
been prohibited in the Roman Catholic Church and is not a 
dominant form of penance in other religions. From an 
economic point of view this practice makes much sense. 
Penances that involve great hardship to the penitent and serve 
nobody else are clearly Pareto-inferior. Ekelund et al. (1989, 
p. 316) argue that the individual priests had an incentive to 
overcharge, and this 'could cause disgruntlement among the 
faithful and, if not checked, could make their demand more 
elastic, ultimately reducing the profits flowing to the papacy.' 
This argument is in two ways problematic. First, it ignores the 
possibility that the '[competitive] priest-sellers' may equally 
have had an incentive to undercharge: by offering better terms, 
each priest could attract more customers, in particular the rich, 
and thereby earn more money. Second, if there was any incen- 
tive to overcharge, there was also an easy way to curb this 
incentive: the penances could be made payable directly to an 
agency of Rome. Thus the prohibition of selling indulgences 
cannot be attributed to problems of overcharging, it must rest 
in the fact that the selling of indulgences was considered 
inconsistent with the teachings of the church. It was not their 
excessive price that must have been considered detrimental but 
rather the fact that they were available for money that marked 
- 
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them as belonging to the mundane sphere.35 (There was cer- 
tainly no problem with undercharging in practice since the 
selling of indulgences continued during its prohibition, but this 
is, as I said, hard to explain.) In the end, we must conclude 
that an economically efficient practice like the selling of indul- 
gences was abandoned because it posed a threat to the coher- 
ence of the creed. 
Market Structure 
From an economic point of view we may say that religious 
services are usually supplied under monopolistic conditions: 
we find one big market leader, or two of them, and in addition 
the sects as small specialised suppliers. This feature must be 
explained. We may also ask what public policy we should 
recommend with respect to such markets: should we enforce 
competition, or should we encourage monopoly? Should we 
finance the churches publicly through taxation or leave it to 
their private initiative how they obtain their income? 
If religious services are supplied by individual priests under 
competitive conditions, this may have some undesirable con- 
sequences. Priests may try to maximise the size of their con- 
gregation by lowering their religious standards, denounce 
their competitors, and spoil the market. Hume expressed this 
as follows: 'Each ghostly practitioner, in order to render 
himself more precious and sacred in the eyes of his retainers, 
will inspire them with the most violent abhorrence of all other 
sects, and continually endeavour, by some novelty, to excite 
the languid devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid 
to truth, morals, or decency in the doctrines in~ulcated.'~~ 
This kind of cutthroat competition can be avoided by restrict- 
ing market entry (Leland, 1979). The Indian caste system 
provides an example, with professions tied to caste. Profes- 
sional associations in law and medicine provide other 
examples. If the suppliers of religious services can avoid cut- 
throat competition by some agreement and this improves effi- 
ciency, one would expect entry restrictions and monopolisation 
to appear in such a market. Note that the monolithic market 
structure associated with the Roman Catholic church has 
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evolved over time, and Rome had presumably mainly a co- 
ordination function at the beginning. 
The argument does not explain the monopolistic market struc- 
ture fully. There is a similar potential for cutthroat competition 
among physicians and lawyers. Similar problems arise here 
since quality cannot be judged easily by the customer, and 
reputation therefore plays a major role. This creates an incen- 
tive to create a reputation rather than offering a good service. 
The market response has been heavy regulation, mainly by 
means of entry restrictions, but not full centralised monopolisa- 
tion. Why these different outcomes? 
In many other markets reliability problems have been solved in 
still other ways. Consider products where reputation is impor- 
tant and quality is ill defined. Here the manufacturers of 
perfume, watches, luxury cars, and so forth, fix definite stan- 
dards for the quality of decoration and service of the retail 
shops. The quality of these products largely rests in their 
'image', and not so much in objective features. Competition 
may induce suppliers to sell a brand perfume by the gallon at 
a stiff discount. This would spoil the market and must be 
prevented. Similarly, means must be found to prevent indivi- 
dual priests from offering eternal bliss too cheaply. It may thus 
be argued that uncertainty about the quality of the product 
leads to a centralised mechanism that guarantees, and in fact 
controls, the quality of the product. For many other products, 
franchising emerges as a market solution to cope with compar- 
able reliability problems, and religious organisations have been 
interpreted indeed as franchising arrangements (Ekelund et al., 
1989, p. 317; Dolin et al., 1989). 
However, the services of a lawyer or a physician seem to 
depend very heavily on their individual ability, and not so 
much on the quality of the tools they employ, or the materials 
they use. In other words, they produce idiosyncratically. In 
contrast, the priests largely produce standardised products. In 
fact, the standardisation is a major aspect of quality since it 
contrib~vtes to reliability by increasing consistency. This creates 
a tendency towards monopolisation and makes it under- 
standable why we do not find independent priests competing 
- 
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against each other. The high costs involved in switching from 
one creed to the other also contributes to monopolisation. 
As a matter of fact, we do not find monopolistic market struc- 
tures everywhere. There are many rather small Protestant 
churches in the USA. As is to be expected, there is much more 
religious advertising than, say, in Germany, but quality dete- 
rioration is somehow prevented by a franchise-type mechan- 
ism. At the same time, many Protestant churches in the USA 
are centred around the individual preacher. This expresses 
itself in various ways: the name of the preacher may be written 
in large letters at the entrance of the church, advertisements 
are personalised, and people seem to choose a church accord- 
ing to the preacher. This may relate to the fact that in Protes- 
tantism the only reliable source of religion is the Holy Bible 
anyway, and this lessens the push towards central control. 
Interesting empirical suggestions arise here concerning a com- 
parison between Christianity and Islam: Islam seems much 
better defined and hence less in need of an authority that 
establishes quality standards. It is also less centrally organised. 
A similar claim could be made in a comparison between the 
Catholic and Protestant churches. Such a dependency of reli- 
gious organisation on the nature of the faith would instance 
that cultural factors can influence institutionalisation in a 
somewhat independent way. 
The monopoly interpretation makes many features of church 
organisation, in particular with respect to the Roman Catholic 
church, understandable. The account given by Ekelund et al. 
(1989) is indeed impressive. They show that there was an ela- 
borate system permitting lucrative rent collection by Rome, 
and that the prohibition of usury was in the interest of the 
church since it permitted the church as a borrower to obtain 
cheaper loans, and as a lender to prohibit competition while 
tacitly charging fees that it condemned as usurious in others 
(Ekelund et al., 1989, pp. 324-326). The monopoly view, in 
conjunction with the nature of the product, would suggest 
some other features. Since the services are not transferable to 
other persons, we should expect price discrimination, but this 
is not a feature that catches immediate attention.37 We should 
also find product differentiation to suit different groups of 
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customers, and we indeed find some tolerance for different 
traditions within the larger churches. Too much differentiation 
would infringe, however, on overall coherence, and so we 
find that the churches try to restrict variation below what the 
denominations would prefer. Further, monopoly does not 
exclude potential competition. Even IBM must share the 
computer market with rivals. Since it seems very easy, in 
principle, to set up a new religion, the market for religion 
seems to be contestable, were it not for the high switching 
costs that dissuades adults from switching away from the 
belief inculated into them as children. 
Quality Competition 
Reli 'om romise heaven and hell. Heaven is desirable, hell is 
n o t 8  Ge&rally, firms prosper by offering products that are 
valuable to consumers. It seems therefore that there should be 
a tendency to improve the product by stressing the desirable 
features and attenuating the undesirable ones. This would 
come about either by competition between the religions, or by 
competition between different factions within a religion. In 
other words, quality competition should work in the field of 
religion in the same way as in other markets. As hell is not 
valued by consumers, this attribute should be minimised, and 
paradise should be certain. However, we do not observe an 
erosion of the threat of condemnation, and an inflation of 
promises for paradise. Thus the economic approach seems to 
be misleading. 
This is, however, much too easy an answer. We should look at 
the problem more closely. It may be that the promise of hell 
for the sinner will act as a sorting device for new customers. 
The members of a religion may simply enjoy the company of 
virtuous people, and abhor vice. If vice is stiffly penalised, this 
will repel the sinners to the benefit of the members and may 
thus be an appropriate market response.39 Since vice affects the 
well-being of the other members adversely, there should be a 
penalty on vice for the members such that each member has an 
incentive to take the negative impact of his own behaviour on 
the others into account. Further, prohibitions that seem to have 
no utility to the members may limit activity outside the 
- 
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religious sphere and therefore increase religious participation, 
which may be valued by the members. It is therefore quite 
compatible with this line of argument that each member feels 
constrained by the teaching of the religion: The benefit gener- 
ated for others by obedience outweighs the potential benefit 
the individual may obtain by neglecting the rule. This will 
limit the erosion of hell.40 
Note that this gives at the same time considerable power to the 
priests who interpret the religion, especially if the church is 
run as a near monopoly! 
Unintended Consequences 
Religious activity may be analysed by looking at the motives 
of the believers, and by trying to understand their actions. This 
may help us to understand the rise and nature of religious 
organisation. Religion may also have broad consequences for 
society at large, which are unintended by-products of religious 
activity from the point of view of the faithful. 
It has been stressed by various authors that these unintended 
by-products are extremely important. Religions may promote 
honesty, and this reduces the necessity for surveillance and 
other unproductive activities. (It should be noted here that 
virtue may often have good, but sometimes also dire con- 
sequences.) In the economists' language, it reduces 'transaction 
costs1 and may involve tremendous gains for society at large 
(Iannacone and Hull, 1991). Religions may also be thought of 
as aligning reproductive behaviour with environmental condi- 
tions (Reynolds, this volume, Reynolds and Tanner, 1983). The 
evidence is, however, unclear with regard to modern societies, 
see below. Further, religion may foster what Einstein (1982, 
p. 52) called a 'religious attitude' on which science builds 
'. . . the conviction that the universe of ours is something 
perfect and susceptible to the rational striving for knowledge', 
but often religions have also hindered science. This ambiva- 
lence is well illustrated by Jones (this volume). 
All these features are to be seen as what they are: unintended 
by-products of religious practice, just as the 'Teflon' pan was 
an unintended by-product of the first expedition to the moon, 
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but does not explain that endeavour. Still, these unintended 
by-products may be very valuable and may make a society 
flourish that has adopted a religion with particularly favour- 
able by-products (Hull and Bold, 1989, p. 6). 
In so far as the unintended consequences of religion give rise to 
benefits for society at large, these benefits constitute what econ- 
omists call 'positive externalities', and they give religion the 
character of a (partially) public good, putting the churches and 
schools in the same category. (This is actually the view adopted 
by Smith, 1976). We should expect, therefore, that activities of 
this sort tend to be subsidised by the community. Hull and 
Bold (1989, pp. 6-7) argue that this should be the more pro- 
nounced with regard to religion the less other institutions are 
available that perform the function. Many advocates of religion 
actually stress the positive effect of religion on morality, and 
that this is to the benefit of society, but such a defence certainly 
does not vindicate religion for its own sake. After all, we do not 
fly to the moon in order to develop 'Teflon' pans. 
Religion as a Seed C ystal  
Religious congregations may lend themselves conveniently to 
serve other than religious functions. Weber (1949, pp. 207-218) 
illustrates nicely how membership of a respected sect in the 
USA around 1900 served as an important credential, compar- 
able perhaps to a major credit card today. 'If a member of a 
sect moved to another place, or if he was a commercial tra- 
veller, he took a certificate of his congregation with him that 
made it possible to obtain credit everywhere'.41 
Religious congregations indeed perform many social functions 
that could also be attached to other kinds of clubs, like golf 
clubs, rifle associations, and singing-clubs. In this, organised 
religion may act simply as a seed crystal for other social for- 
mations, but these are, to a large extent, accidental to religious 
organisation. They may stabilise it, or may destabilise it, but 
these features should vary from society to society and cannot 
easily account for the broad regularities across religions, e.g. 
with regard to worship, marriage, and death rituals, that we 
observe. 
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THE FORCE OF RELIGION 
The Behavioural Impact of Religion 
On the surface it seems that religion has an important impact 
on behaviour. The impact of religion, however, remains con- 
troversial. 
Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) have surveyed research on 
this. Beit-Hallahmi (1989, p. 62) concluded that religion does 
not have any considerable effect on secular behaviour except in 
two areas: sexual behaviour and drugs. Similarly, Medoff and 
Skov (1992) find no impact of fundamentalism on social 
deviance, except sexual morality. Coleman (this volume) finds 
that religious affiliation has no sigruficant effect on fertility; 
Iannacone (1993) reports that religious fundamentalism in the 
USA has little substantive impact on behaviour, or on views 
about economic policy; and Kuran (1983, 1993) argues that the 
economic teachings of Islam have not influenced economic 
behaviour very much. Jones (1988, pp. 93-107) points to the 
malleability of Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism. These reli- 
gions posed no obstacle to growth. 
Everyday experience also confirms a high degree of malle- 
ability of religions. Churches change their position with regard 
to the role of women, abortion, divorce, homosexuality, and so 
forth, to comply with current social trends. It is interesting to 
see how this fits with the idea of good continuity. Feminist 
theologians seem to be worried by the idea of having equal 
rights for men and women on earth along with a patriarchic 
heaven, and so they bring heaven more in line with current 
trends by insisting that current conceptions of religious affairs 
are due to misreadings. 'Things like that aren't intentional mis- 
readings; they just come from the culture of the time' (Allen, 
1991b, p. 7B, quoting the theologian Chris Franke). In this way, 
psychological dissonances can be removed by a suitable 
exegesis of the sacred texts, a phenomenon that perhaps cannot 
in itself be explained by economic reasoning alone. Note that 
these developments occur among Christians, Muslims and 
Jews at same time (Allen, 1991, p. 7R). This stresses the fairly 
general nature of the desire for good continuity that may 
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account for malleability if religion adapts to praxis, but may 
also account for inflexibility if reality is forced to appear as 
good continuity of heaven. Ultimately, the constancy/malle- 
ability issue seems to be a matter of relative flexibility of the 
base vis-ii-vis the superstructure. 
We find many assertions to the effect that religion is indeed of 
great importance. Weber (1930) took Protestantism as a prime 
mover of capitalism, although he made it clear that causality 
runs in both ways; Stewart (this volume) stresses the con- 
stancy, or inflexibility, of Islam that accounts for both its 
successes and its drawbacks; and the recent fundamentalist 
revolution in Iran seems to indicate that religion may indeed 
have strong implications for human action.42 
More cautiously, Tanner (this volume) argues that religion has 
been a strong secondary back-up rather than a primary moti- 
vation for economic change in the societies he studied. Further, 
if it is held that religions have unintended consequences, they 
must have consequences. 
Some implications of religion are, however, straightforward. 
The clergy is able to make a living from offering religious 
services. In 1989, the West German members of the Roman 
Catholic church and the Lutheran church combined con- 
tributed 14 billion Deutschmarks of (voluntary) contributions, 
which amounts to 0.8 per cent of G N P . ~ ~  
It seems clear, too, that religious teachings can induce severe 
feelings of guilt, especially with regard to sexual matters, in 
adolescents and may influence aspects of their behaviour. 
On balance, however, the issue seems to remain unsettled. It is 
rather unclear in what way religions play an active part in 
social life, and are not merely reflecting changes in economic 
and social conditions. If religions are only passively respond- 
ing to these changes, we should be able to interpret religious 
institutions as optimal responses to prevailing conditions, and 
we should not expect to find inefficient religious practices; 
these should have been competed away.44 So let us turn to the 
question of possible inefficiencies in religious organisation. 
146 Survival and Religion 
Inejjkiencies in Religion: Holy Cows 
It is true that specialists often insist on the functional value of 
various strange religious practices. In order to clear the 
ground, I shall clalrfy the nature of these arguments by means 
of an example. Harris (1978) writes rather comprehensively 
about the functionality (or lack of disfunctionality) of the 'holy 
cows' in India, and this provides a convenient starting point. 
The Hindus in India venerate cows. There is a prohibition on 
slaughtering them, and a taboo on eating beef for the non- 
pariahs. At first glance, the custom seems inefficient, particu- 
larly in view of the many problems plaguing India. Harris 
stresses, however, the functional value of this custom by 
pointing out its benefits to society. First, cows produce dung 
which is the chief burning material in the Indian household. 
Second, oxen are extremely important for agriculture, and to 
have oxen, there must be cows that give birth to them. If cows 
are eaten in bad times, there will be no oxen later, and the 
'survival into old age of a certain number of absolutely useless 
animals during good times is part of the price that must be 
paid for protecting useful animals against slaughter during bad 
times' (Harris, 1978, p. 16). Third, the cows feed to a large 
degree on garbage that is of no use to humans, but the meat of 
the dead cows provides cheap food for the pariahs, and many 
things can be produced from the hides. It may therefore be 
quite sensible for humans to share sparse food with holy cows; 
the benefits may outweigh the losses. 
Let us assume for the moment that all this can be accepted 
(although I have my doubts), but look a little closer. Harris 
(1978, pp. 16, 23) writes: 'But I wonder how much is actually 
lost by the prohibition on slaughter and the taboo on beef . . . 
If cow love prevents farmers from killing cows that are eco- 
nomically useless, how is it that there are 30 per cent fewer 
cows than oxen? Since approximately as many female as male 
animals are born, something must be causing the death of 
more females than males. The solution to this puzzle is that 
while no Hindu farmer deliberately slaughters female calves or 
decrepit cows with a club or knife, he can and does get rid of 
them when they become truly useless from his point of view. 
- 
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To "kill" unwanted calves, for example, a triangular wooden 
yoke is placed about their necks so that when they try to nurse 
they jab the cow's udder and get kicked to death.' 
There are, of course, cheaper ways of killing calves. Therefore, 
a rule stating that a calf may be killed if it is less than 2 weeks 
old 'because it is not really a cow' would be more efficient. 
Similarly, a rule stating that cows may not be slaughtered in 
bad times would be better than a general prohibition on 
slaughtering that keeps useless cows alive even in good times. 
The Functionalist Fallacy 
It is not necessary to enlarge on this and similar defences of 
strange religious practices. The general point seems to be that 
the usefulness of a rule is defended by arguing that the situa- 
tion would be worse without such a rule. This is, however, an 
irrelevant benchmark for comparison if it is held that religious 
customs are efficient solutions to certain problems. The appro- 
priate standard of comparison would be to compare one rule 
with other conceivable rules and to show that the one rule that 
we find in reality actually offers the best solution to the given 
problem under the given circumstances. It often seems easy to 
refute such a claim. If it is held, however, that a given rule is 
just one solution to a given problem, but not necessarily the 
best, this position comes down to the statement that whatever 
we find in reality can somehow survive-a thought that con- 
tributes next to nothing to our understanding. 
Note that all these problems arise before anything has been 
said about the reasons that may be responsible for producing 
functional rules! 
Religious Drift 
There are, however, hidden assertions in Harris's argument 
that, I think, highlight the ways in which religion may influ- 
ence behaviour. 
The first assertion is simply that religion actually influences 
behaviour. More exactly, it is held that religion is able to stabi- -
148 Survival and Religion 
lise a rule of conduct that restrains the individual's self-seeking 
behaviour to the benefit of all. 
Second, religion cannot implement every rule. There must be a 
general prohibition on slaughtering cows at all times in order 
to prevent their slaughtering in bad times. By implication, a 
rule that would prohibit the slaughtering of cows only in bad 
times and is better according to the argument, could not be 
sustained by the Hindu creed, and the Hindu creed could pre- 
sumably not easily be adapted without infringing on coher- 
e n ~ e . ~ ~  
Ultimately, such an argument comes down to saying that 
coherence requirements bias behaviour away from what would 
be otherwise preferable. We should find, therefore, that reli- 
gions are favourable to certain developments, and less favour- 
able to others. In an evolutionary context, religions should be 
seen as biasing variation; they induce, so to speak, genetic drift 
in cultural evolution. Any religion has a tendency, ultimately 
founded in our quest for sense, to push things in a certain 
direction, but it is a tendency only, which may be superseded 
by other influences.46 Its ultimate importance will, therefore, 
depend on the relative strength of the other forces acting at 
any given moment of time. 
Accentuation 
Consider, however, another strange set of religious phenomena 
that seems to be inefficient, and indeed really hannful: the 
practices of male and female circumcision in Africa. These 
practices are very painful and, given the hygienic circum- 
stances, very dangerous. This may be illustrated by the follow- 
ing accounts. 
Barley (1986, pp. 49-50) describes male circumcision among 
the Dowayos: 'The operation is very severe, the penis being 
peeled for its entire length . . . If the operation is performed 
young, the penis sometimes assumes an almost spherical form 
that must be in part responsible for the very low birth rate of 
the Dowayos.' - 
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Armstrong (1991, pp. 22-23) describes female circumcision: 
I. . . infibulation, the most drastic form known as 'pharaonic 
circumcision', involves the removal of all the external genitalia 
and the stitching up of the two sides of the vulva to leave only 
a tiny opening for the passage of urine and menstrual blood 
. . . The immediate and long-term risks to health are enormous. 
Many little girls bleed to death because clumsy operators have 
cut into the pudendal artery or the dorsal artery of the clitoris 
. . . Many circumcised women suffer infertility as a result of 
frequency pelvic infections or scar tissue blocking the fallopian 
tubes.' 
Whatever the functions may be that are ascribed to such prac- 
tices, it seems that there are better means to achieve the same 
end. The birth rate may be reduced by other practices, chastity 
could be enforced by religious and criminal law, and sexual 
pleasure is certainly not increased by this practice-neither for 
the mutilated nor for the ~nmutilated.4~ 
The practice is defended as an accentuation of the male-female 
difference: 'According to the Bambaras in Mali, each baby is 
born with rudimentary characteristics of the opposite sex that 
must be cut away to make the child wholly male or femalet4' 
We may thus say that religion establishes a certain meaning of 
manhood and of womanhood, perhaps as good continuity of 
current social practice, and uses circumcision to bring men and 
women in line with this view, thereby reconfirming the reli- 
gious belief and the social practice. By interlinking various 
elements in a coherent way, all elements will be strengthened. 
This may help us to understand the function of seemingly inef- 
ficient practices, and also the forces that maintain them.4"t 
should be clear, however, that these functions and these forces 
are not entirely reducible to extracultural impulses. They ulti- 
mately built on the quest for sense. 
CONCLUSION 
Many features of religious organisation seem to be in broad 
conformity with an economic interpretation, once a basic 
demand for religious activity is presupposed. Such a demand 
- 
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has been related here to the quest for sense. It gives rise to 
religious organisation through market processes, broadly 
understood. The quest for sense, as well as a pervasive relia- 
bility problem, renders coherence of the teachings important, 
and this gives rise to particularities in organisation, e.g. that 
the churches try to restrict variability among their denornina- 
tions to some extent. It makes it also possible to address rather 
specific phenomena of pricing, market structure and so forth. 
We find, however, many particularities that are not easily 
compatible with an economic interpretation. The selling of 
indulgences is, from an economic point of view, to be preferred 
over other forms of penance, but the practice has been abol- 
ished in the Roman Catholic church, and we do not find it in 
many other religions. This is hard to explain unless it is posited 
that the introduction of money infringes on coherence. In a 
similar vein we find that many churches restrict their economic 
activities to a certain product range even if they have a compe- 
titive advantage beyond that range; they seem reluctant to turn 
themselves into commercial enterprises. Again, the coherence 
argument may be invoked here, but it seems unclear why 
coherence should be infringed; an answer in terms of coherence 
often poses more of a problem than a solution. Other instances 
of the same sort of problem are provided by 'holy cowr-type 
inefficiencies and dangerous rituals like male and female cir- 
cumcision, and they suggest the same woolly answer. 
These and other problems, that any economic interpretation of 
religion must face, suggest, however, that cognitions, inter- 
pretations, and the emotions going along with them, do have 
an independent impact on real processes. This impact may be 
very weak, a hardly noticeable 'religious drift', but it may ulti- 
mately turn out to be very powerful. It may be powerful for 
precisely the same reason that led Marshall (1949, p. 728) to 
insist that economic forces eventually undermine the strongest 
custom: 'And it is an almost universal rule that when the 
effects of a cause, though small at any one time, are constantly 
working in the same direction, their influence is much greater 
than at first sight appears possible.' We may add with 
Marshall (1949, p. 560) that influences working in this 'cumu- 
lative' way may 'therefore exert a deep and controlling influ- 
- 
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ence over the history of the world.' I hasten to add that this b 
a theoretical possibility, more part of a problem than part of an 
answer. 
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NOTES 
- - 
1 More precisely, economists would not deny that inefficient insti- 
tutions may exist and may be stable in some sense, but would 
not say that institutions are totally rigid; the rules are somewhat 
fuzzy, and there is continuous social experimentation going on, 
deliberately or by mistake, and Darwinian competition between 
institutional forms will ultimately supersede inefficient institu- 
tions by more efficient variants. Although this view has its 
critics even within economics, it seems to be the dominant 
approach. 
2 Surveys of recent contributions to the economic analysis of 
religion may be found in Iamacone and Hull (1991); 
Schmidtchen and Mayer (1993). 
3 I may point out here that I take my starting point from Asch's 
(1g87) book on social psychology; see Schlicht (1990b) ,for a 
review. 
4 Alchian (1950) offers a classic statement of this position. See 
Schlicht (1990d) for further references and discussion. 
5 Woodward (1958, p. 21); see also Alchian (1950); Caves (1980). 
Survival and Religion 
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) introduce for instance the 'afterlife 
consumption motive'. 
Iannacone (1990, p. 312) submits that the sidestepping of ques- 
tions relating to the nature of religion is actually beneficial to the 
economic discourse, presumably because it avoids unfruitful 
debate. It also links religious phenomena to other phenomena, 
such as clubs and political parties (Iannacone, 1992, p. 272). This 
is an advantage. On the other hand, analyses conducted in this 
vein leave the impression of arbitrariness in the sense that they 
may apply to anything and nothing. Bruce (1993, p. 194) main- 
tains that such an approach could be viable only in a thoroughly 
secular society. F 
Becker (1971) has introduced the term 'taste for discrimination' 
in the context of racial and sexual economic discrimination, 
which illustrates this use (or misuse) of notions in economics. 
See Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, pp. 180-183) on cognitive 
need theories about religion, and on some of the evidence; Opitz 
(1975) for an introduction to Lhi-Strauss' thoughts; Zimbardo 
(1969) for a study of cognitive dissonance in various fields. 
The theoretical basis for this view may be found in the work of 
the Gestalt psychologists Wertheimer (1935) and Kohler (1938). 
They developed the notion of 'requiredness' that refers to what 
is demanded by our interpretation of objective circumstances 
quite independently of our own wishes. The requiredness notion 
comprises many aspects of the dissonance reduction motive, but 
it goes far beyond cognitive need theory since it refers also to a 
fit between emotions and cognitions. In this sense, the position 
outlined above should not be seen as a cognitive need theory of 
religion. 
The underlying psychological tendency is the tendency to 
Prapanz, but I try to avoid the German term because it is so 
close to 'pregnancy'. I shall speak instead of a tendency to 
maximum clarity and the quest for sense, although this may 
carry wrong connotations as well. (The German 'Pragnanz' 
refers to clarity, articulation, perspicuity, cogency, and terse- 
ness. It is a central notion in Gestalt psychology, but is hard to 
translate.) 
de Mandeville (1924) has contrasted these interpretations 
delightfully. 
- 
Economic Analysis and Organised Religion 153 
13 Smith (1979, p. 43) calls this the continuity view, as opposed to 
the discontinuity view in the Christian tradition. 
14 The argument presupposes implicitly that simplicity judgements 
are objective in character, since the series (1) can be seen as gen- 
erated by any polynomial of sufficiently high degree and with 
appropriate coefficients. This is ruled out because it is 'too com- 
plicated', 'not unique' or 'does not make sense'. It seems to be 
true, however, that such judgements go far beyond merely sub- 
jective expressions. In the language of Gestalt psychology, the 
arithmetic schema is the most appropriate for (1) because it has 
the highest Pragnanz, see note 11 above. 
15 Uvi-Strauss (1962) has illustrated this impressively. Platinga 
(1979) provides a modem theological discussion and makes a 
related point when stating '. . . that we must evaluate the 
rationality of the belief in God by examining its relation to other 
propositions' (p. ll), but he confines himself to stating that it is 
not irrational to believe in God, whereas the first argument goes 
further in maintaining that a belief in God (or something else) 
may enhance our understanding and may be considered posi- 
tively rational in this sense. Iannacone and Hull (1991) propose 
that religion is 'a primitive science'. This view may be too uncri- 
tical of current science and tends to discount the complexities of 
religious thoughts in many cultures; it also tends to overlook the 
interlinkage between cognition and ethical judgements. 
16 Piaget (1965, p. 33) insists that the obligatory character of rules, 
as opposed to a mere perception of regularity, results from social 
interaction. This is compatible with what I have said, but adds 
another element. It seems to me, however, that this social 
element, although often important, is not a conditio sine qua nnn 
for introducing obligation. If a picture hangs on a wall in an 
inclined position, this may induce strong feelings of obligation 
even if nobody has told us to hang pictures in a straight position, 
and similar very intense attempts to restore whatever is per- 
ceived as the proper order may be observed in young children. 
17 Allen (1991a); Applebome (1991). 
18 With regard to recent political events it may be added that a belief 
in God may ease certain political actions. If these actions are con- 
sidered necessary, this will strengthen the belief. Adams (1979) 
explores the general idea of a moral defence for religious belief 
and Mackie (1977, pp. 227-232) provides a critical evaluation. 
- 
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19 1 don't want to joke here. Quite often the economists are right, 
and typically they are less extreme than the following examples 
may suggest (I am a reluctant believer). I simply want to render 
the position of the religious believers who see an apparition 
more respectable and understandable, and at the same time 
question the universal validity of the economists' approach in 
order to defend the continuity thesis mentioned in note 13 
above. 
20 The economic view of social phenomena underlying this type of 
analysis has been paradigmatically stated by Stigler and Becker 
(1977). 
21 I owe this point to David Coleman. 
Kahnemann et al. (1986) use the term 'framing' in the context of 
economics. Asch (1987, pp. 207-221, pp. 419-449) gives a more 
detailed account of the effect of context on meaning and illus- 
trates this nicely by his famous 'warm-cold' and 'Jefferson- 
Lenin' experiments. That these phenomena are largely indepen- 
dent of previous experience was shown by Gottschaldt (1926). 
By the way, the 'Gestalt switch' illustrated in Figures 3.1 to 3.4 
bears some resemblance to St Paul's experience: by changing the 
frame, things appear in a new light. 
23 For more on schemata, see Anderson (1985, pp. 124-134). 
24 Levelling and sharpening effects were first studied system- 
atically by Wulf (1922) in the context of visual perception, but 
the phenomenon covers many psychological processes. Kelley's 
(1973, p. 113) 'discounting principle' (which is central for 
modem attribution theory) refers to phenomena of this type, for 
instance. 
In Schlicht (1979, pp. 58-61) it is argued that the process of 
communication is another source of accentuation. 
25 John Dickhaut pointed out to me that churches may actually not 
be inclined to accentuate a certain interpretation; rather they 
may offer a pattem of propositions, rituals and tales that can be 
interpreted in various ways. Each client may choose that inter- 
pretation, which satisfies his quest for sense, and the church is 
able, at the same time, to satisfy the desires of a large and quite 
heterogeneous membership. This would build on a quest for 
sense on the individual level, but use it more indirectly on the 
organisational level. 
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The term was introduced by Darby and Karni (1973); see Hull 
and Bold (1987 . Credence goods that are non-rival or partially 
non-rival are Bn) own as 'trust goods'. The notion has been intro- 
duced by Burton Weisbrod (1988, 60). Ben-Ner and van 
Homissen (1991) provide an innovative analysis of the problems 
that trust goods create and what kind of market and organisa- 
tional responses may be expected. Ben-Ner has pointed out to 
me that an explicit discussion of the credence good problematic 
can be found in Arrow (1963, pp. 949, 965). 
An argument could be made to the effect that the conditions on 
Mars may become directly verifiable in future, but a similar 
claim could be made with regard to religious propositions as 
well. 
The size of the market will of course limit specialisations; and 
thus this refers to congested areas. 
Co-ordination may also take place through the market. 
Ekelund et al. (1989, p. 325). Church banks would have to be 
run today as non-profit institutions in order not to infringe the 
propensity of the members to give voluntary contributions. 
The term is used only provisionally here. The quest for sense is, 
after all, a quite active force, and not merely a rather passive 
constraint. 
The restriction of the activity range may also be linked to the 
arguments for non-profits as advanced by Ben-Ner, and van 
Hornissen (1991), see above. Note also that some churches, such 
as the Mormons and the Roman Catholic church, do engage in 
banking activities and many other commercial activities on a not 
insigruficant scale. 
The argument presupposes, however, a certain homogeneity in 
demand. 
Ekelund et al. (1989, p. 314) argue that confessions may offer a 
possibility for the supplier (the church) to determine the state of 
demand and exploit this knowledge; see note 37 below. 
This applies not only to religion, but,quite broadly to many 
economic phenomena that otherwise would be incompatible 
with economic theory; with regard to labour economics see 
Schlicht (1990a), with regard to obedience, contracting and routi- 
nisation see Schlicht (1990d). - 
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See Walzer (1983) for the idea that there are different social 
spheres. 
The quotation is taken from Smith (1976, II, p. 312). The 
argument led Hume to propose that the state should provide an 
independent income for the clergy and thereby reduce religious 
zeal. Adam Smith himself proposed competition between many 
religious groups and held that 'provided these sects were suffi- 
ciently numerous, and each of them consequently too small to 
disturb the public tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each for its 
particular tenets could not well be productive of any hurtful 
effects.' (Smith 1976, 11, p. 315). This argument seems to 
overlook the possibility of destructive competition that I have 
stressed here. 
On Adam Smith's view of religious organization, see also 
Anderson (1988). 
Ekelund et al. (1989, p. 314) argue that the rite of confession, in 
conjunction with the practice of selling indulgences, gave the 
clerics a unique method of determining a penitent's demand 
elasticity that could be exploited in a return-maximising way. 
This is obviously very schematic but may serve to illustrate the 
point; see also Hull and Bold (1989, pp. 6-7). 
This argument implicitly makes reference to psychological 
mechanisms, since belief in a religion excludes leaving the 
religion because it is too costly to adhere to it. If adherence is 
very costly, however, this may induce dissatisfaction and 
openness to information that runs contrary to the creed. In this 
way, too high costs may reduce demand. 
Iannacone (1992, p. 281) has introduced the 'screening' idea into 
the economics of religion, albeit in a slightly different context. 
Weber (1949, p. 211) points out that American congregations 
screen their members carefully in many ways. 
The argument that restrictions of other activities may increase 
religious participation is due to Iannacone (1992). The general 
argument bears some resemblance to Stiglitz' (1975) point that 
workers may freely choose a supervisor who constrains their 
behaviour. 
My translation; the argument of this section is closely related to 
Olson's (1965, pp. 132-167) argument about 'by-product' and 
'special interest' theories of pressure groups. 
- 
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42 Communism, especially in the form of Stalinism, has left cer- 
tainly its mark in history. Although it is not a religion in any 
transcendental sense, the 'historical laws', to which it appeals, 
are taken as absolute; in that, it has features of a religion. 
43 In West Germany, church fees are collected by the tax autho- 
rities if a tax payer declares that they are a church member. The 
numbers are based on the Bundesamt fiir Statistik (1990, pp. 86, 
87, 566). With regard to America, Weber (1947, p. 208) reports 
that the usual church contributions amounted to nearly 8% of 
average income! (This refers to a small town at the turn of the 
century.) 
44 The explanation of institutions as optimal responses to prevail- 
ing conditions is central to the 'New Institutional Economics'. 
The approach is nicely illustrated by the works of North and 
Thomas (1973), Posner (1973, 1981) and Williamson (1975) and 
critically evaluated in Basu et al. (1987). 
45 Similar arguments appear repeatedly in Harris' work. To take 
just one further example, he writes with regard to preference for 
boys and the neglect of girls among the Yanomamo 'Rather, the 
effective basis of Yanomamo women's nursery practices is their 
own interest in raising more boys than girls . . . A higher ratio of 
men to women means more protein per capita (because men are 
the hunters) and a slower rate of population growth. It also 
means more warfare, but for the Yanomamo, as for the Maring, 
warfare is the price paid for raising sons when they can't raise 
daughters' (Harris, 1978, p. 91). 
The general point is related to the issue discussed in the con- 
troversy between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, since 
the latter degenerates into the former if all behavioural descrip- 
tions pass as rules, and the argument may fail only if 'the rules 
are to be social realities', and this poses an additional constraint 
on them, closely akin to the 'meaning constraint' mentioned in 
above. (The quotation is from Mackie, 1977, p. 138, who offers a 
nice discussion of this problem.) 
46 Jones (1988, pp. 87-107) argument about the malleability of reli- 
gions refutes the thesis that religions pose absolute obstacles t~ 
growth, but seems consistent with the drift thesis; see also Jones 
(this volume). 
47 Armstrong (1991, p. 24) argues that female circumcision is 'a 
physiological chastity belt', but see also Lightfoot-Klein (1989, 
pp. 23-26.) 
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48 Armstrong (1991, p. 24); see also Lightfoot-Klein (1991, p. 29). 
Barley (1986, p. 53) however, remarks that this widespread 
explanation is not without problems even if the accentuation 
argument is accepted: 'But one problem remains. In females, 
breasts are functional and necessary to feed the young. In males 
they are not. Why, therefore, do men not cut off their nipples as 
an intrusive female element rather than remove their foreskins? I 
know of no documented example anywhere in the world'. In 
other words, there are usually various ways to accentuate or 
make good continuations, and there are, perhaps, more efficient 
ways. So why this accentuation? 
49 Basu et al. (1987, p. 18) speak in this context of 'cultural inter- 
linkages'. 
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